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Abstract: Heterogeneous wireless sensor networks (HWSNs) are employed in many real-time
applications, such as Internet of sensors (IoS), Internet of vehicles (IoV), healthcare monitoring,
and so on. As wireless sensor nodes have constrained computing, storage and communication
capabilities, designing energy-efficient authentication protocols is a very important issue in wireless
sensor network security. Recently, Amin et al. presented an untraceable and anonymous three-factor
authentication (3FA) scheme for HWSNs and argued that their protocol is efficient and can withstand
the common security threats in this sort of networks. In this article, we show how their protocol is not
immune to user impersonation, de-synchronization and traceability attacks. In addition, an adversary
can disclose session key under the typical assumption that sensors are not tamper-resistant.
To overcome these drawbacks, we improve the Amin et al.’s protocol. First, we informally show that
our improved scheme is secure against the most common attacks in HWSNs in which the attacks
against Amin et al.’s protocol are part of them. Moreover, we verify formally our proposed protocol
using the BAN logic. Compared with the Amin et al.’s scheme, the proposed protocol is both more
efficient and more secure to be employed which renders the proposal suitable for HWSN networks.
Keywords: heterogeneous wireless sensor networks; authentication; traceability attack;
de-synchronization attack
1. Introduction
In wireless sensor networks (WSNs) there are many sensor nodes scattered in a defined area [1].
These networks can be categorized into two important classes: homogeneous and heterogeneous
sensor networks. On the one hand, in homogeneous sensor networks, all the sensor nodes are equal
in terms of energy and hardware complexity. On the other hand, heterogeneous sensor networks
(HWSNs) include various types of wireless sensor nodes with different capabilities and functions.
In HWSNs, the sensors share their functions and increase the reliability of the network without
increasing the cost of implementation [2–5]. Some of these sensors are low-cost, low-power and
consequently have constrained computational power, transmission range, storage capacity and battery
life [6]. It is clear that there are great needs to design energy-efficient protocols for such networks.
In HWSN, users communicate to the sensor nodes to acquire data of their own interest. Therefore,
the user and sensor node authentication is an important line of research in HWSN security which has
recently awakened interest from the network security research community. In HWSN, the gateway
node (GWN) plays an essential part in the authorization procedure since this element is the connection
(input/output) with the all the elements outside the network. As shown in Figure 1, there are
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five models in authenticating users and sensor nodes in HWSN [7]. In these five schemes, a user,
a gateway node and a sensor node implement the authentication protocol by exchanging four messages
(e.g., Figure 1(a.1–a.4)). In each scheme, there are four steps: (1) the gateway node authenticates the
user (e.g., Figure 1(a.1)); (2) the sensor node authenticates the legitimate user and the gateway node
(e.g., Figure 1(a.2)); (3) the sensor node verifies the legitimacy of the gateway node (e.g., Figure 1(a.3));
and finally, (4) in the last step, the user authenticates the legitimate sensor node (e.g., Figure 1(a.4)).
Since HWSN nodes face with to many limitations in power consumption and communication range,
models, in which a user and a sensor are a long way apart, are not practical, Figure 1e,b,d [8,9].
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Figure 1. Five user authentication models in HWSN [7].
To tackle with security challenges of HWSN networks, we need lightweight enough and secure
schemes. In the literature, authentication protocols are the most common adopted solution [7,10–14].
Unfortunately, most of them do not provide the required security and present important security
pitfalls or are not energy-efficient. In this vein, recently, Amin et al. presented an untraceable and
anonymous 3FA scheme for HWSNs. They used the model depicted in Figure 1a to design their
protocol and asserted that their protocol can resist all common attacks known in the context of
HWSN [15]. Nevertheless, in this article, we cryptanalyzed this protocol to show that this scheme is
vulnerable against user impersonation, de-synchronization and session key disclosure attacks and also
the adversary can trace the user. In order to hinder these attacks, we improve the Amin et al.’s protocol.
1.1. Our Contribution
The contributions of this article are summarized as below:
 At first, we present several serious security attacks against the Amin et al.’s scheme [15].
Our proposed attacks include de-synchronization, user impersonation, user traceability and
session disclosure attacks.
 In order to increase the security level offered by Amin et al.’s protocol, we remedy the security
faults found in their scheme.
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 The security of the proposed scheme has be scrutinized from a formal and informal point of view.
The attacks mentioned in Amin et al.’s protocol and other common security attacks have been
considered in the design of the new protocol.
 The efficiency of our proposal is higher than the offered by Amin et al.’s scheme. Therefore,
our scheme can be used for resource constrained sensors as the ones employed in HWSNs.
1.2. Paper Organization
The organization of the article is as follows. In Section 2, some related work are presented.
Section 3 introduces the required preliminaries and notations. We review Amin et al.’s protocol in
Section 4. Section 5 shows the security pitfalls of this scheme. We propose the improved scheme in
Section 6. Then, we discuss the security of the proposed protocol in an informally way in Section 7,
while, in Section 8, a formal analysis is presented. Finally, we extract some conclusions in Section 9.
2. Related Work
In a wireless sensor network, to allow a legitimate user to obtain information from a target sensor,
the system needs to verify the validity of user by running an authentication protocol. In this section,
we briefly discuss some existing schemes that aim to increase the security level of these networks.
Two-factor Authentication Schemes: Several two-factor authentication (2FA) schemes have been
proposed for WSN, where the login phase of these protocols is based on passwords and smartcards.
In 2006, Wong et al. [16] presented a 2FA protocol based on the use of a hash function for
wireless sensor networks, but the authors in [11] found that the protocol suffers from serious
security pitfalls (i.e., replay, stolen-verifier and forgery attacks). To overcome these important
weaknesses, authors in [11] proposed a new 2FA protocol based on passwords and smartcards.
However, this protocol also is not immune against denial of service attacks and the nodes can be
compromised [17].
In 2010, to improve the [11] protocol, Chen et al. [10] presented a bilateral authentication
protocol in which three entities are involved (i.e., users, sensor nodes and the gateway node).
In the same year, Khan et al. [12] showed that [11] fails in the authentication and in the key
updating mechanism and presented a new protocol that they claimed it hinders the mentioned
attacks. Later, Vaidya et al. [18] introduced several security vulnerabilities in [10–12] based on the
stolen smartcard assumption. Xue et al. in 2013 presented a mutual authentication protocol based
on temporal credentials, which is mainly based on the use of hash functions [7]. Nevertheless,
He et al. [19] showed how the above protocol [7] is not resistant against user node and sensor
node impersonation attacks and proposed a new temporal-credential-based protocol to overcome
these weaknesses. In addition, Mir et al. [20] compromised the security of the healthcare system
designed by He et al. [21], uncovering impersonation and password disclosure attacks. In addition,
Turkanovic et al. [22] presented another bilateral authentication scheme in the context of HWSNs.
However, Amin and Biswas [23] examined the Turkanovic et al. scheme and identified certain
security problems (e.g., offline identity and password guessing attacks) and finally claimed to remove
these security pitfalls in an efficient protocol. In the same year, Farash et al. [6] showed also some
security shortcomings in [22] and proposed a new lightweight protocol. In the context of lightweight
cryptography, Gope et al. [24] presented a 2FA protocol with especial security features including user
anonymity and forward/backward secrecy. Soon, in [25], the authors analyzed the Gope’s protocol by
presenting a session key disclosure attack.
Three-Factor Authentication Schemes: In 2016, Amin et al. [26] pointed out how the Farash et al.
protocol is susceptible to a number of attacks and proposed a new mechanism which was claimed to
be resistant against these attacks. To enhance the security flaws of 2FA protocols, Amin et al. proposed
a three-factor authentication (3FA) scheme based on password, smartcard and biometric trait linked
to the legitimate user. However, Arasteh et al. [27] proposed replay and Denial-of-Service (DoS)
attacks against Amin et al.’s scheme. In 2017, the authors in [28] presented an smartcard loss attack
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against Amin et al.’s 3FA protocol [26]. They also showed that the attacker can reveal the session keys
in other sessions of the protocol. To overcome the security flaws of this protocol, they proposed the
enhanced scheme based on the Rabin’s cryptosystem. In the same year, Jiang et al. [29] presented
a solution to enhance the security of another 3FA protocol [30] that suffers from important security
faults including traceability, identity guessing, offline password guessing, user impersonation and
server impersonation attacks.
Chang et al. in [31] found several vulnerabilities in the Turkanovic et al. 2FA protocol [22] and
presented an enhancement solution, but the scheme was shown to be vulnerable to a wide set of attacks
such as traceability, information disclosure or session key attacks [15]. Eventually, Amin et al. [15]
presented a new untraceable and anonymous 3FA scheme for HWSNs which was argued to be the
improved version of Chang et al. scheme. Nevertheless, in this article, we scrutinize the security of this
3FA protocol and show how it is vulnerable to user impersonation, de-synchronization and session
key disclosure attacks and also the adversary can trace the user. To prevent these attacks, we upgrade
the Amin et al.’s protocol and analyze its security from a formal and informal perspective.
Privacy Schemes: In some of the protocols mentioned, the authors have stated that their schemes
can preserve the user’s privacy. To do this, the user’s identifier is encoded using a dynamic identity.
This anonymous identifier is used when the user communicates with the gateway node, and this
information is useless for the attacker to reveal the user’s identity [24]. In detail, in schemes [7,32,33],
the authors claim that their proposals preserve users’ privacy. Unfortunately, all of them fail in this
purpose [24].
Threat Model: Our threat model mainly follows the Dolev–Yao model [34]. Therefore,
the adversary can intercept, modify, delete and change any of messages transmitted over the insecure
communication channel. The adversary can also execute side channel attacks and then obtain the
secrets stored on the smartcard. In addition, the adversary can capture the sensors and reveal
their private information stored in their memory as these devices do not have tamper protection
mechanisms [24].
3. Preliminaries and Notations
This section first shows the notations used in this paper and then revises the proposed fuzzy
extractor function for extracting the biometric parameters required for the third factor of the
authentication procedure.
3.1. Notations
The notation used through this article is summarized in the Table 1.
3.2. Fuzzy Extractor
The facts that biometric tokens cannot be easily guessed, are difficult to be copied, shared and
forged, and are not lost or forgotten makes biometric based authentication more preferable than
traditional password based ones [35,36].
A fuzzy extractor can generate cryptography keys over noisy data. In other words, they are
error tolerant. In detail, this is composed of two processes, a probabilistic algorithm GEN and a
deterministic algorithm REP as described below:
1. The generation procedure (GEN): given a biometric input Bi, this probabilistic algorithm
generates a secret key yi and a non-secret string qi, i.e., GEN(Bi) = (yi, qi).
2. The reproduction procedure (REP): given the noisy input Bi and the corresponding
auxiliary string qi, this algorithm is able to recover the same key yi as in the generation
process, i.e., yi = REP(Bi , qi).
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Table 1. Notations.
Notation Description
Ui The i-th user
GWN The gateway node
SCi The smartcard of Ui
Sj The j-th sensor node
Zq Multiplicative group, where q is a large prime,
Zq = fx : 0 < x < q, gcd(x, q) = 1g
IDi Identity of Ui
SIDj Identity of Sj
XGWN Secret key of GWN
fi Secret key linked to Ui
f j Secret key linked to Sj
PWi Password linked to Ui
Bi Biometric trait linked to Ui
Ki Nonce generated by Ui
Kj Nonce generated by Sj
SKi, SKj, SKG Session key
REP(), GEN() Fuzzy extractor operations
yi, qi Outputs of GEN() algorithm
Ti Timestamp
DT Allowable transmission delay
h() One-way hash function
 Bitwise XOR operation
k Concatenation operation
4. Review of Amin et al.’s Scheme
In this section, we scrutinize the security of the authentication protocol proposed by Amin
et al., which is composed of nine phases: (1) pre-deployment; (2) user registration; (3) login;
(4) authentication and key agreement; (5) updating; (6) post-deployment; (7) password recovery;
(8) password change; and (9) smartcard revocation.
4.1. Pre-Deployment Phase
Firstly, the gateway node GWN chooses XGWN as a long-term secret key and assigns identities
SIDj to the sensor nodes Sj (1  j  m for a population of m sensor nodes in the network).
Then, the GWN calculates f j = h(SIDjkXGWN) and stores hSIDj, f ji into the memory of Sj.
4.2. User Registration Phase
Using a secure channel, the user Ui executes the following steps in conjunction with the GWN.
Step 1. Ui chooses an identity IDi, attaches to it a personal credentials (e.g., social security number),
and submits both values to the GWN.
Step 2. If the GWN does not find IDi in the database, it generates ri 2R Zq and calculates MIi =
h(IDikri) and fi = h(MIikXGWN). Both values (hMIi, fii) are stored in a new smartcard SCi
and the device is handed over to Ui.
Step 3. Once receiving the smartcard, Ui chooses a password PWi and then uses a sensor device to
obtain his biometric information Bi and finally writes hPWi, IDi, Bii to the SCi.
Step 4. SCi uses the fuzzy extractor technique to calculate (yi, qi) = GEN(Bi), it then computes
Ai = h(IDikPWikyi), Ei = qi  h(IDikPWi), Ci = fi  h(PWikyi), REC = PWi  h(IDikyi),
REGi = h(IDi  yi) and deletes fi.
Finally, the smartcard contains the tuple hMIi, Ci, Ei, Ai, REC, REGi, GEN(), REP(), h()i.
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4.3. Login Phase
The user Ui follows these steps to access the data collected by sensor Sj.
Step 1. Ui inserts SCi into the terminal and then enters ID0i and PW
0
i and also uses the sensor device
to imprint his biometric information B0i .
Step 2. SCi retrieves q0i = Ei  h(ID0ikPW 0i ) and computes y0i = REP(B0i , q0i), f 0i = Ci  h(PW 0i ky0i)
and A0i = h(ID
0
ikPW 0i ky0i). SCi verifies the correctness of A0i. If so, SCi concludes ID0i = IDi,
PW 0i = PWi and B
0
i = Bi; otherwise, SCi denies Ui.
Step 3. SCi generates Ki 2R Zq and computes Ni = h(MIikKik fikT1kSIDj), Li = Ki  h(MIik fikT1),
Pi = SIDj  h( fikT1) and Qi = h(IDi) h(KikT1) —T1 represents the current timestamp.
Finally, SCi sends the tuple hMIi, Ni, Pi, Qi, Li, T1i to GWN through an insecure channel.
4.4. Authentication and Session Key Agreement Phase
Two goals are achieved in this phase (see Figure 2): (1) Ui and Sj are authenticated through GWN;
and (2) Ui and Sj set a session key. In particular, the following five steps are executed.
Step 1. After receiving the message hMIi, Ni, Pi, Qi, Li, T1i in login phase, the GWN checks whether
the timestamp condition j T1   T2 j DT holds, T2 being the current time of GWN.
If the condition is fulfilled, the GWN aborts the connection. Otherwise, it calculates
f 0i = h(MIikXGWN) and then decodes K0i = Li  h(MIik f 0i kT1), h(IDi) = Qi  h(K0ikT1)
and SID0j = Pi  h( f 0i kT1). It then computes N0i = h(MIikK0ik f 0i kT1kSID0j) and checks the
validity of the received Ni. If so, the GWN identifies to Ui as an authorized user. If not,
it aborts the connection.
Step 2. Then, GWN calculates f 0j = h(SIDjkXGWN), Nj = h(h(IDi)k f 0jkT2kKi), SSj = h(IDi) h( f 0jkT2)
and Vj = Ki  h(IDi). GWN then sends the tuple hNj, SSj, Vj, T2i to Sj.
Step 3. Upon receiving the message hNj, SSj, Vj, T2i, Sj checks the validity of timestamp
T2. If j T2   T3 j> DT, it terminates the connection. Otherwise, Sj computes
h(IDi) = SSj  h( f jkT2), K0i = Vj  h(IDi) and the N0j = h(h(IDi)k f jkT2kK0i) and verifies
the validity of received Nj. If it is invalid, then Sj aborts the session. Otherwise, it generates
Kj 2R Zq and computes SKj = h(h(IDi)kSIDjkK0ikKj) as a session key and then computes
Wj = h(SKjkT3) and Kij = Ki  Kj. Then, Sj sends the tuple hWj, Kij, T3i to GWN.
Step 4. Once the message hWj, Kij, T3i is received, the GWN verifies the freshness of T3.
If j T3   T4 j> DT, GWN aborts the connection. Otherwise, it decodes K0j = Kij  Ki and
calculates the session key SKG = h(h(IDi)kSID0jkK0ikK0j). It then computes W 0j = h(SKGkT3)
to verify the correctness of the received Wj. If the above verification fails, then GWN
discontinues the session. Otherwise, it calculates M1 = h(SKGkK0jkT4) and forwards the
message hM1, Kij, T4i to Ui.
Step 5. Once the message hM1, Kij, T4i is received, Ui checks whether the condition j T4   T5 j DT is
satisfied. If it is not fulfilled, Ui aborts the session. Otherwise, it calculates K0j = Kij  Ki,
SKi = h(h(IDi)kSIDjkKikK0j) and M01 = h(SKikK0jkT4) to verify the correctness of the
received M1. Now the entities are mutually authenticated and a session key SKi = SKG = SKj
has been negotiated.
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If |𝑇2 − 𝑇3| 𝑇 then <Reject> 
Else 
Computes ℎ(𝐼𝐷𝑖) = 𝑆𝑆𝑗 ℎ(𝑓𝑗||𝑇2) 
𝐾𝑖
′ = 𝑉𝑗 ℎ(𝐼𝐷𝑖), 𝑁𝑗
′ = ℎ(ℎ(𝐼𝐷𝑖)||𝑓𝑗||𝑇2||𝐾𝑖
′) 
If 𝑁𝑗
′ ≠ 𝑁𝑗 then <Reject> 
Else 
<𝑈𝑖  is authenticated > 
Computes 
𝑊𝑗 = ℎ(𝑆𝐾𝑗||𝑇3), 𝐾𝑖𝑗 = 𝐾𝑖
′ 𝐾𝑗 
 
𝑆𝐾𝑗 = ℎ(ℎ(𝐼𝐷𝑖)||𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑗||𝐾𝑖
′||𝐾𝑗) 
If |𝑇4 − 𝑇5| 𝑇 then <Reject> 
Else 
Computes 𝐾𝑗
′ = 𝐾𝑖𝑗 𝐾𝑖 
 𝑀1
′ = ℎ(𝑆𝐾𝑖||𝐾𝑗
′||𝑇4) 
If 𝑀1
′ ≠ 𝑀1 then <Reject> 
Else 
Computes 𝑀2 = 𝐼𝐷𝑖 ℎ(𝑆𝐾𝑖||𝐾𝑖) 
𝑆𝐾𝑖 = ℎ(ℎ(𝐼𝐷𝑖)||𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑗||𝐾𝑖||𝐾𝑗
′) 
𝑈𝑖  inserts 𝑆𝐶𝑖 into terminal  
𝑈𝑖 inputs <𝐼𝐷𝑖
′, 𝑃𝑊𝑖
′> and 𝐵𝑖
′ 
𝑆𝐶𝑖 computs 𝜃𝑖
′ = 𝐸𝑖 ℎ(𝐼𝐷𝑖
′||𝑃𝑊𝑖
′) 
𝜓𝑖
′ = 𝑅𝐸𝑃(𝐵𝑖
′||𝜃𝑖
′), 𝑓𝑖 = 𝐶𝑖 ℎ(𝑃𝑊𝑖
′||𝜓𝑖
′) 
If 𝐴𝑖
′ ≠ 𝐴𝑖 then <Reject> 
Else 
Generates 𝐾𝑖 and 𝑇1 
Computes 𝑁𝑖 = ℎ(𝑀𝐼𝑖||𝐾𝑖||𝑓𝑖||𝑇1||𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑗) 
𝐿𝑖 = 𝐾𝑖 ℎ(𝑀𝐼𝑖||𝑓𝑖||𝑇1), 𝑃𝑖 = 𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑗 ℎ(𝑓𝑖||𝑇1) 
 
𝐴𝑖
′ = ℎ(𝐼𝐷𝑖
′||𝑃𝑊𝑖
′||𝜓𝑖
′) 
𝑄𝑖 = ℎ(𝐼𝐷𝑖) ℎ(𝐾𝑖||𝑇1) 
Computes 𝑀5
′ = ℎ(ℎ(𝐼𝐷𝑖)||𝑀3||𝑀4) 
If 𝑀5
′ ≠ 𝑀5 then <Reject> 
Else 
Computes 𝑀𝐼𝑖
′ = 𝑀3 ℎ(𝐼𝐷𝑖), 𝑓𝑖
′ = 𝑀4 ℎ(𝑓𝑖||𝐾𝑖
′) 
Stores <𝑀𝐼𝑖
′, 𝐶𝑖
′>, Deletes <𝑀𝐼𝑖, 𝐶𝑖> 
𝐶𝑖
′ = 𝑓𝑖
′ ℎ(𝐼𝐷𝑖||𝜓𝑖
′) 
       User (Ui/SCi)                                                                                                                   Gateway node (GWN )                                                            Sensor node (Sj)  
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𝑀1,𝐾𝑖𝑗 ,𝑇4 
 
𝑊𝑗 ,𝐾𝑖𝑗,𝑇3 
 
𝐾𝑖
′ = 𝐿𝑖 ℎ(𝑀𝐼𝑖||𝑓𝑖
′||𝑇1) 
𝑁𝑖
′ = ℎ(𝑀𝐼𝑖||𝐾𝑖
′||𝑓𝑖
′
𝑖
||𝑇1||𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑗
′) 
𝑁𝑗 = ℎ(ℎ(𝐼𝐷𝑖)||𝑓𝑗
′||𝑇2||𝐾𝑖
′) 
If |𝑇1 − 𝑇2| 𝑇 then <Reject> 
Else 
Computes 𝑓𝑖
′ = ℎ(𝑀𝐼𝑖||𝑋𝐺𝑊𝑁) 
ℎ(𝐼𝐷𝑖) = 𝑄𝑖 ℎ(𝐾𝑖
′||𝑇1), 𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑗
′ = 𝑃𝑖 ℎ(𝑓𝑖
′||𝑇1) 
If 𝑁𝑖
′ ≠ 𝑁𝑖 then <Reject> 
Else 
<𝑈𝑖  is authenticated > 
Computes 𝑓𝑗
′ = ℎ(𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑗
′||𝑋𝐺𝑊𝑁) 
𝑆𝑆𝑗 = ℎ(𝐼𝐷𝑖) ℎ(𝑓𝑗
′||𝑇2), 𝑉𝑗 = 𝐾𝑖
′ ℎ(𝐼𝐷𝑖) 
𝑀𝐼𝑖 ,𝑁𝑖,𝑃𝑖 ,𝑄𝑖, 𝐿𝑖 ,𝑇1 
 
Insecure Channel Insecure Channel 
𝑁𝑗 , 𝑆𝑆𝑗 ,𝑉𝑗 ,𝑇2 
 
𝑆𝐾𝐺 = ℎ(ℎ(𝐼𝐷𝑖)||𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑗
′||𝐾𝑖
′||𝐾𝑗
′) 
𝑊𝑗
′ = ℎ(𝑆𝐾𝐺||𝑇3) 
If |𝑇3 − 𝑇4| 𝑇 then <Reject> 
Else 
Computes 𝐾𝑗
′ = 𝐾𝑖𝑗 𝐾𝑖
′ 
If 𝑊𝑗
′ ≠𝑊𝑗  then <Reject> 
Else 
Computes 𝑀1 = ℎ(𝑆𝐾𝐺||𝐾𝑗
′||𝑇4) 
𝑀2 
 
𝑀5 = ℎ(ℎ(𝐼𝐷𝑖)||𝑀3||𝑀4) 
Computes 𝐼𝐷𝑖
′ = 𝑀2 ℎ(𝑆𝐾𝐺||𝐾𝑖
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Figure 2. Authentication and key agreement phases in Amin et al.’s protocol [15].
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4.5. Update Phase
In this phase, in order to achieve user untraceability, Ui updates hMIi, Cii as follows:
Step 1. Ui computes M2 = IDi  h(SKikKi) and sends it to GWN as a confirmation
message. After receiving the message, GWN decodes IDi = M2  h(SKGkK0i) and
updates MI0i = h(IDikr0i) and f 0i = h(MI0ikXGWN), where r0i 2R Zq . It then computes
M3 = MI0i  h(IDi), M4 = f 0i  h( fikK0i) and M5 = h(h(IDi)kM3kM4) and sends the tuple
hM3, M4, M5i to Ui.
Step 2. After receiving the message hM3, M4, M5i, Ui calculates M05 = h(h(IDi)kM3kM4) to check
the validity of the received M5. If so, it extracts MI0i = M3  h(IDi) and f 0i = M4 
h( fikK0i) and computes C0i = f 0i  h(IDikyi). Then, Ui rewrites hMI0i , C0ii to SCi instead
of previous hMIi, Cii.
4.6. Post-Deployment Phase
A new sensor node Sk is used in this phase to replace a damaged sensor node Sj. The GWN
generates a new identity SIDk and then calculates fk = h(SIDkkXGWN) and stores hSIDk, fki in
Sk’s memory.
4.7. Password Recovery Phase
Ui executes this phase when he forgets his password. Ui needs to insert SCi in the card reader and
enter his identity IDi along with Bi. Now, the SCi computes y0i = REP(B
0
ikqi) and REG0i = h(IDiky0i).
Then, SCi checks whether REG0i = REGi. If so, then it computes PWi = REC h(IDikyi) and sends
the recovered password to the user.
4.8. Password Change Phase
The password of the user Ui can be updated by executing the updating procedure with SCi and
without the intervention of GWN. In detail, the following steps show how the user can update the old
password PWi for a new one PWnewi .
Step 1. Ui inserts SCi in to the terminal and enters hID0i , PW 0i i along with biometric information B0i .
Step 2. SCi uses the fuzzy extractor technique to calculate (y0i , q
0
i) = GEN(B
0
i), it then computes
A?i = h(ID
0
ikPW 0i ky0i) and f 0i = Ci  h(PW 0i ky0i). If (A?i = Ai), then SCi requests Ui to enter a
new password PWnewi at SCi; otherwise, SCi aborts this procedure.
Step 3. Now, SCi calculates Anewi = h(IDikPWnewi ky0i), Enewi = q0i  h(IDikPWnewi ),
Cnewi = Ci  h(PWiky0i  h(PWnewi ky0i)), RECnew = PWnewi  h(IDiky0i) and replaces
hAi, Ei, Ci, RECi with hAnewi , Enewi , Cnewi , RECnewi.
4.9. Smartcard Revocation Phase
Generally, smartcards can be lost, stolen or damaged. Thus, the smartcard revocation phase is
very important. This phase is executed as described below:
Step 1. Ui submits IDi and a personal credential (e.g., social security number) to the smartcard issuer.
Step 2. If the smartcard issuer can find IDi in the database, it generates ri 2R Zq and calculates
MInewi = h(IDikri) and f newi = h(MInewi kXGWN). It then writes hMInewi , f newi i into a new
smartcard SCnewi and delivers it to the user Ui.
Step 3. Once SCnewi is received, Ui chooses a password PW
new
i , receives new biometric information
Bnewi from the sensor and writes hPWi, IDi, Bii to the SCi.
Step 4. SCi uses the fuzzy extractor technique to calculate (yi, qi) = GEN(Bnewi ). It then computes
Anewi = h(IDikPWnewi kyi), Enewi = qi  h(IDikPWnewi ), Cnewi = f newi  h(PWnewi kyi),
RECnew = PWnewi  h(IDikyi) and REGnewi = h(IDi  yi), and implants
hCnewi , Enewi , Anewi , RECnew, REGnewi , GEN(), REP(), h()i into SCi and deletes f newi .
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5. Security Analysis of Amin et al.’s Protocol
In [15], the authors claimed that the adversary/attacker A cannot trace or identify the user Ui
using the transmitted messages. Moreover, they claimed that the attacker cannot impersonate the user
by accessing to the old login eavesdropped messages.
Unfortunately, for Amin et al.’s protocol, we show how the proposed protocol is not immune
against user impersonation and de-synchronization attacks. The user can be also tracked by an attacker
who eavesdrops on only one protocol session. In addition, we provide evidence of how an adversary
can easily obtain the session key under the assumption that sensors are not tamper-resistant.
5.1. User Impersonation Attack
In this attack, we point out how an adversary A is authenticated by both the gateway node GWN
and the sensor node Sj. The attack is described below:
 A eavesdrops on the message hMIi, Ni, Pi, Qi, Li, T1i sent by Ui to the GWN, then he changes the
Qi value to Q0i.
 After receiving the message hMIi, Ni, Pi, Q0i, Li, T1i in the login phase, the GWN checks
two issues: (1) timestamp condition j T1   T2 j DT and (2) validity of the received
Ni = h(MIikKik fikT1kSIDj), which does not depend on Qi. Thus, the GWN accepts these two
conditions and computes h(IDi)? = Q0i  h(K0ikT1) and SID0j. It then calculates N0i . Now, the
GWN believes that A is an authorized user.
 Then, GWN calculates f 0j and then computes Nj = h(h(IDi)?k f 0j kT2kKi),
SSj = h(IDi)?  h( f 0j kT2) and Vj = Ki  h(IDi)? and sends the tuple hNj, SSj, Vj, T2i to Sj.
 Sj check the correctness of timestamp and computes h(IDi)? = SSj  h( f jkT2), K0i = Vj  h(IDi)?
and N0j = h(h(IDi)
?k f jkT2kK0i) and checks validity of the received Nj. It generates Kj 2R Zq and
computes SKj = h(h(IDi)?kSIDjkK0ikKj) as a session key and then computes Wj and Kij. Now,
the Sj also believes that A is an authorized user and sends the tuple hWj, Kij, T3i to GWN.
 The GWN checks the validity of T3. It decodes K0j and computes the session key
SKG = h(h(IDi)?kSID0jkK0ikK0j). It then computes W 0j = h(SKGkT3) and checks validity of the
received Wj and computes M1 = h(SKGkK0jkT4) and sends the message hM1, Kij, T4i to Ui which
is the adversary. At this point, the adversary sends the random number M2 to GWN as a
confirmation message. After receiving the message, GWN uses the message to obtain IDi which is
the random number. Due to the absence of any checking process, it employs this value to compute
M3, M4 and M5 and then sends the tuple hM3, M4, M5i to the adversary.
Following this attack, the adversary cheats GWN and Sj to pass the protocol with the success
probability of “1”. Moreover, GWN and Sj establish the wrong session key along with h(IDi)?.
5.2. De-Synchronization Attack
In Amin et al.’s authentication phase, an adversary A by eavesdropping only one session can
reveal the h(IDi) of the user Ui and uses it to render the user to a de-synchronization state as follows.
Note that, in the proposed attack, the superscript j indicates the parameters of the j-th run of protocol,
j = 1, 2. In addition, in the Amin et al. scheme, the values of h(IDi) of the user Ui is a constant value.
In detail, the attack can be executed following the steps described below:
 A eavesdrops on the message M13 = MI2i  h(IDi) from session 1;
 A eavesdrops on the message MI2i from session 2;
 A obtains h(IDi) from equation h(IDi) = M13 MI2i ;
 In Step 6 of the authentication phase, A intercepts hM23, M24, M25i and modifies them to M?3 , M?4
and M?5 = h(h(IDi)kM?3kM?4);
 A sends the tuple hM?3 , M?4 , M?5i to Ui;
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 Ui calculates M?5 = h(h(IDi)kM?3kM?4) and then checks validity of the received M?5 . Then,
it extracts MI0i = M
?
3  h(IDi) and f 0i = M?4  h( fikK0i) and computes C0i = f 0i  h(IDikyi). Then,
Ui rewrites hMI0i , C0ii to SCi instead of previous hMIi, Cii.
Following this attack, the adversary compels the Ui to insert the wrong hMIi, Cii into SCi’s
memory. Now, Ui cannot use SCi to do the login.
5.3. User Traceability Attack
Following the privacy model proposed by Ouafi and Phan [37], the attacker can perform following
phases to mount a traceability attack.
Step 1. In round n, A sends an Execute query(GWN, U0, n) and eavesdrops on messages MI
U0
0,n,
QU00,n = h(ID0)
U0
n  h(KU00,nkTU01,n), TU01,n , V
Sj
j,n = K
U0
0,n  h(ID0)U0n and MGWN3,n ;
Step 2. The adversary A selects two users U0 and U1 and sends a Test query(U1, U0, n +
1) and depending on the random bit b 2 f0, 1g the adversary A receives
a h(IDb)Ub 2 fh(ID0)U0 , h(ID1)U1g corresponding to users fU0, U1g;
Step 3. A sends an Execute query(GWN, Ub, n + 1) and eavesdrops on messages MI
Ub
b,n+1,
QUbb,n+1 = h(IDb)
Ub
n+1  h(KUbb,n+1kTUb1,n+1), TUb1,n+1, V
Sj
j,n+1 = K
Ub
b,n+1  h(IDb)Ubn+1 and MGWN3,n+1;
Step 4. A guesses the random bit b = 0 if h(ID0)
U0
n = h(IDb)
Ub
n+1 with a probability higher than a
random coin flip following the procedure described below.
Step 5. We have,
h(IDb)
Ub
n+1 = Q
Ub
b,n+1  h((V
Sj
j,n+1  (MIUbb,n+1 MGWN3,n )kTUb1,n+1),
h(ID0)
U0
n = Q
U0
0,n  h((V
Sj
j,0  (MIUbb,n+1 MGWN3,n )kTU01,n),
 As h(IDi)Ui is constant and the user does not update it,
 If h(IDb)Ubn+1 = h(ID0)U0n , then Ub = U0.
Step 6. As a result, we can express AdvUNTA (k) = jPr[A guesses b correctly]  12 j = j1  12 j = 12  e(k);
Following the described attack, the attacker can trace any target user Ui. In other words,
Amin et al.’s scheme is not resistant against user traceability attack.
5.4. Session Key Disclosure Attack
As described in Section 5.2, A can extract h(IDi) belonged to Ui. Thus, if we assume that the
sensor Sj is not equipped with tamper-resistant, A obtains hSIDj, f ji from sensor’s memory—note
that the adversary does not require f j to execute the proposed attack. Then, it executes the session key
disclosure attack as follows:
 A eavesdrops on messages T1 and Vj = K0i  h(IDi)0;
 A obtains Ki from equation Ki = Vj  h(IDi);
 A obtains Kj from equation Kj = Kij  Ki;
 A computes the session key SKj using the SKj = h(h(IDi)kSIDjkK0ikKj).
Therefore, an adversary can disclose the session key in Amin et al.’s protocol.
Finally, we would like to highlight that all our proposed attacks exploit the fact that the bitwise
XOR operation is a source of vulnerability against passive and active attacks [38–40].
6. Our Proposed Protocol
We present an enhanced version of Amin et al.’s protocol to remedy its security pitfalls.
The scheme, as the original proposal, is split into night phases: (1) pre-deployment; (2) user registration;
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(3) login; (4) authentication and key agreement; (5) update; (6) post-deployment; (7) password recovery;
(8) password change; and (9) smart revocation. As we only enhanced the (3), (4), and (5) phases, these
are the ones that we describe.
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Figure 3. Modified Amin et al.’s authentication and key agreement phase. Changes are highlighted by
boxes in the proposed scheme.
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In summary, the enhanced authentication and key agreement phase, and update phase of the
proposed scheme, as shown in the blue boxes in Figure 3, have five important changes. To prevent the
user impersonation attack, the user makes uses of Qi in the message Ni. Subsequently, the gateway
node GWN verifies this value to authenticate the legitimate user (boxes number 1 and 2). To overcome
the de-synchronization attack, we change the format of message M3 as well as the equation the user
employs to update MIi. Therefore, the attacker cannot obtain h(IDi) by XORing these two values
(boxes number 4 and 5). To avoid the replay attack, the gateway node GWN checks the validity of M2
by verifying the value of h(IDi) (box number 3).
6.1. Login Phase
In this phase, we employ the Qi in Ni to guarantee the integrity of Qi. Ui performs the following
steps to login when it wishes to access data collected by Sj:
Step 1. Ui inserts SCi into the terminal and then enters ID0i and PW
0
i and also uses the sensor device
to imprint his biometric information B0i .
Step 2. SCi retrieves q0i = Ei  h(ID0ikPW 0i ) and computes y0i = REP(B0i , q0i), f 0i = Ci  h(PW 0i ky0i)
and A0i = h(ID
0
ikPW 0i ky0i). SCi checks validity of A0i. If so, SCi implies ID0i = IDi, PW 0i = PWi
and B0i = Bi; otherwise, SCi denies Ui.
Step 3. SCi generates Ki 2R Zq and calculates Li = Ki  h(MIik fikT1),
Pi = SIDj  h( fikT1), Qi = h(IDi) h(KikT1) and Ni = h(MIikKik fikT1kSIDjkQi), T1
being the current timestamp.
After this, SCi forwards the tuple hMIi, Ni, Pi, Qi, Li, T1i to GWN using a public communication
channel.
6.2. Authentication and Session Key Agreement Phase
At this point, Ui and Sj are authenticated through GWN and a session key is set between both
entities. In addition, we modify the message M3 to tackle the attacker when she tries to obtain h(IDi)
in the next session. In Figure 3, we summarize the details of this phase:
Step 1. Once the message hMIi, Ni, Pi, Qi, Li, T1i is received in the Login phase, the GWN checks
whether the timestamp condition j T1   T2 j DT holds. If the condition is fulfilled,
the GWN terminates the connection. Otherwise, it calculates f 0i = h(MIikXGWN) and
then decodes K0i = Li  h(MIik f 0i kT1) and SID0j = Pi  h( f 0i kT1). It then calculates
N0i = h(MIikK0ik f 0i kT1kSID0jkQi) and checks validity of the received Ni. If so, the GWN
identifies to Ui as an authorized user. If not, it terminates the connection.
Step 2. Then, GWN obtains h(IDi) = Qi  h(K0ikT1) and calculates f 0j = h(SIDjkXGWN) and then
computes Nj = h(h(IDi)k f 0j kT2kKi), SSj = h(IDi) h( f 0j kT2) and Vj = Ki  h(IDi), T2 being
the current timestamp. GWN then forwards the tuple hNj, SSj, Vj, T2i to Sj.
Step 3. Once the message hNj, SSj, Vj, T2i is received, Sj checks validity of the timestamp
T2. If j T2   T3 j> DT, it terminates the connection. Otherwise, Sj calculates
h(IDi) = SSj  h( f jkT2), K0i = Vj  h(IDi) and N0j = h(h(IDi)k f jkT2kK0i) and checks validity
of the received Nj. If the verification fails, then Sj aborts the session. Otherwise, it generates
Kj 2R Zq and computes SKj = h(h(IDi)kSIDjkK0ikKj) as the session key and then computes
Wj = h(SKjkT3) and Kij = Ki  Kj. Finally, Sj sends the tuple hWj, Kij, T3i to GWN.
Step 4. Once the message hWj, Kij, T3i is received, the GWN verifies the correctness of
T3. If j T3   T4 j> DT, GWN aborts the connection. Otherwise, it decodes K0j = Kij  Ki and
computes the session key SKG = h(h(IDi)kSID0jkK0ikK0j). It then computes W 0j = h(SKGkT3)
and checks the validity of the received Wj. If the above verification fails, then GWN
discontinues the session. Otherwise, it calculates M1 = h(SKGkK0jkT4) and forwards the
message hM1, Kij, T4i to Ui.
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Step 5. Once the message hM1, Kij, T4i is received, Ui checks whether the condition j T4   T5 j DT
is satisfied. If it does not fulfilled, Ui ends the session. Otherwise, it calculates K0j = Kij  Ki,
SKi = h(h(IDi)kSIDjkKikK0j) and M01 = h(SKikK0jkT4) and checks the validity of M1. At this
point, the entities are mutually authenticated and a session key SKi = SKG = SKj has
been negotiated.
6.3. Update Phase
In this phase, Ui updates hMIi, Cii in order to achieve user untraceability, as described in the next
steps and depicted in Figure 3:
Step 1. Ui computes M2 = IDi  h(SKikKi) and sends it to GWN as a confirmation message.
After receiving the message, GWN decodes IDi = M2  h(SKGkK0i) and checks if the
condition h(IDi) = Qi  h(K0ikT1) holds. If the verification fails, then GWN aborts the
session. Otherwise, it updates MI0i = h(IDikr0i) and f 0i = h(MI0ikXGWN), where r0i 2R Zq .
It then computes M3 = MI0i  h(MIikK0j), M4 = f 0i  h( fikK0i) and M5 = h(h(IDi)kM3kM4)
and sends the tuple hM3, M4, M5i to Ui.
Step 2. After receiving the message hM3, M4, M5i, Ui calculates M05 = h(h(IDi)kM3kM4) and
then checks validity of M5. If so, it extracts MI0i = M3  h(MIikK0j) and f 0i = M4 
h( fikK0i) and computes C0i = f 0i  h(IDikyi). Then, Ui rewrites hMI0i , C0ii to SCi instead
of previous hMIi, Cii.
7. Security Analysis of the Proposed Protocol
The proposed protocol is analyzed from an informal and formal point of view. This analysis
shows how the proposed scheme withstands relevant and common security attacks.
The informal security analysis of a security scheme discusses its robustness against the common
attacks known in its context. However, the formal security analysis methods employ mathematics
or logic tools such as BAN-logic [41], AVISPA [42] or Proverif [43] to formally scrutinize the security
of a cryptographic protocol. In this article, we employ the BAN-logic tool to formally verify our
proposed protocol.
7.1. Informal Security Analysis
In this section, we point out how our proposed protocol withstands against relevant and
well-known attacks.
7.1.1. Stolen Smartcard Attack
In our proposal, if the smartcard SCi is stolen or lost, the adversary can access its memory and
obtain all the information MIi, Ai, Ei, Ci, REC and REGi stored in the smartcard. Note that, in our
protocol, the smartcard is not tamper-resistant. Since some values (IDi, PWi and Bi) are unknown for
the adversary, s/he cannot compute q0i = Ei h(ID0ikPW 0i ), y0i = REP(B0i , q0i) and f 0i = Ci h(PW 0i ky0i)
without having any information about these parameters. Furthermore, it is also computationally
unfeasible for the attacker to disclose the IDi, PWi and the secret biometric information Bi of the
user Ui thanks to the collision-resistance property of the one-way hash function. Thus, the proposed
protocol is secure against the stolen smartcard attack.
7.1.2. Offline Password Guessing Attack
In our scheme, the password PWi of the user Ui is involved in Ai, Ei, Ci and REC values, which are
stored in the smartcard. As discussed above, the adversary A cannot use any of these stored items to
obtain the password. In addition, using the messages transferred from the user Ui, the attacker cannot
relate these messages to the items stored on the smartcard to find useful information to verify her/his
guess about PWi. Therefore, our proposed scheme is robust against offline password guessing attack.
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7.1.3. Privileged Insider Attack
In this kind of attack, the insider attacker tries to impersonate the legitimate user by using this
user’s password. However, in the user registration phase of our scheme, Ui only submits IDi as a
registration request. In addition, all the messages transmitted via a public channel are independent of
IDi. Thus, by no means can the insider of GWN get Ui’s password. That is, our proposed protocol is
resistant against the privileged insider attack.
7.1.4. Offline Identity Guessing Attack
On this occasion, the adversary tries to obtain knowledge about the real identity IDi of a user
Ui —the user and GWN are the unique entities who know this information. In our proposal, the
adversary cannot derive IDi from information obtained from the smartcard. In addition, IDi is never
passed over the public communication channel. As a consequence of using the one-way hash function
h(), the adversary cannot find any useful information related to IDi to verify her/his guess. Therefore,
our proposed scheme is robust against identity guessing attack.
7.1.5. User Impersonation Attack
In this attack, the adversary aims to cheat GWN by attempting to take the place of a legitimate
user in the logging phase. S/he may use the eavesdropped login message hMIi, Ni, Pi, Qi, Li, T1i
of the previous sessions to conduct her/his attack. We show how our scheme is resistant against
this attack. Once the eavesdropped message is received, the GWN checks the legitimacy of the
user Ui by validating Ni = h(MIikKik fikT1kSIDjkQi). A has to possess fi and h(IDi) to forge Ni.
However, without having any knowledge about the password IDi, the biometric key and the SIDj of
the smartcard, the adversary A cannot calculate a valid Ni. Therefore, our proposed scheme is secure
against user impersonation attack.
7.1.6. Gateway Node Impersonation Attack
To impersonate the gateway node, the adversary has to forge the message hNj, SSj, Vj, T2i. Thus,
the adversary A needs to know f j, Ki and h(IDi) to compute Nj = h(h(IDi)k f 0j kT2kKi), which is
impossible. Thus, A cannot forge the aforementioned message. In addition, A cannot compute
M1 = h(SKGkK0jkT4) and Kij = Ki  Kj, which are created by GWN. Therefore, our proposed scheme
resists GWN impersonation attack.
7.1.7. Sensor Node Impersonation Attack
In the authentication phase, the typical sensor node Sj computes Wj = h(SKjkT3) and
Kij = Ki  Kj and sends these values along with T3 to the gateway node GWN. To forge the messages
Wj and Kij, the adversary A must compute SKj = h(h(IDi)kSIDjkKikKj) and must know Ki and Kj.
Moreover, A cannot compute SKj without the knowing h(IDi) and SIDj. Therefore, A cannot compute
Sj’s messages to execute a sensor node impersonation attack.
7.1.8. Session Key Security
In the authentication and session key agreement, the attacker can eavesdrop the
messages Wj = h(SKjkT3) and M1 = h(SKGkKjkT4). Nevertheless, the session key
SKj = SKG = h(h(IDi)kSIDjkKikKj) is protected by the usage of the one-way hash function h().
For this, it is computationally impossible for the adversary to derive the used key. Thus, our proposed
scheme provides session key security.
7.1.9. User Anonymity
In our proposed protocol, the identity IDi of user Ui is never passed in plain-text over an
insecure communication channel. In this sense, h(IDi) is the value transmitted in the public
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messages. Due to the collision-resistant property of the one-way hash function h(), deriving IDi
from h(IDi) is computationally impossible for the attacker. Therefore, our proposed scheme preserves
user anonymity.
7.1.10. Preserving User Untraceability
In this attack, an adversary A aims to determine whether two messages are generated by the same
(unknown) user. Luckily, in our proposal, the attacker cannot be able to find any relationship between
Qi, M2 and user’s identity IDi. Furthermore, it must be noted that, in our proposed protocol, all the
parameters used in the messages hMIi, Ni, Pi, Qi, Li, T1i are random. Moreover, when the update phase
of the protocol is executed, Ui updates hMIi, Cii for the next session. Therefore, A cannot determine
whether two protocol sessions are linked to the same user. Therefore, in our proposed protocol, users
cannot be tracked.
7.1.11. Replay Attack
In the replay attack, the adversary forwards eavesdropped messages of the protocol (previous
sessions) to try to deceive legitimate entities. The timestamp values and random numbers used in
all messages of the protocol prevents any replay efforts from attacker. Therefore, replay attacks can
be identified by verifying the freshness of the timestamp values and random numbers. Therefore,
the replay attack does not work in our scheme.
7.2. Formal Security Analysis
We use BAN-logic [41] to conduct the security analysis of the authentication and key agreement
phase of our proposal. Table 2 summarizes the used notation. Thereupon, we introduce the two main
rules used in our analysis.
R1 (Shared key rule). PjP
k !Q,P/[X]k
PjQjX , if P believes that s/he shared the key K with Q, and P
receives the message [X]k; then, P believes that Q sent X.
R2 (Belief rule). PjQj(X,Y)PjQjX , if P believes Q sends the message set (X, Y); then, P believes Q
sends the message X.
Our formal security analysis is split into the following steps:
Step 1. Protocol messages.
PM1: MIi, Ni, Pi, Qi, Li, T1,
PM2: Nj, SSj, Vj, T2,
PM3: Wj, Ki j, T3,
PM4: M1, Ki j, T4,
Step 2. Idealizing the protocol messages. At this point, the protocol messages are converted
into the idealized format based on the BAN-logic notations. The results are denoted by IM1, ..., IM9
as below:
IM1 (Ui! GWN): GWN / fKigh(MIikXGWN),
IM2 (Ui! GWN): GWN / fSIDjgh(MIikXGWN),
IM3 (Ui! GWN): GWN / (MIi, Ki, T1, SIDj, Qi)h(MIikXGWN),
IM4 (Ui! GWN): GWN / fh(IDi)gKi ,
IM5 (GWN! Sj): Sj / (h(IDi), T2, Ki)h(SIDjkXGWN),
IM6 (Sj! GWN): GWN / fKjgKi ,
IM7 (Sj! GWN): GWN / (SKj)T3 ,
IM8 (GWN! Ui): Ui / fKjgKi ,
IM9 (GWN! Ui): Ui / (SKG)Kj .
Step 3. Explicit assumptions. The seven assumptions on the proposed scheme are described by
A1, ..., A7 as below:
A1: Ui j ](Ki, T1, T4),
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A2: GWN j ](T1, T2, T3, T4),
A3: Sj j ](Kj, T2, T3),
A4: Ui j Ui h(MIikXGWN) ! GWN,
A5: GWN j GWN h(MIikXGWN) ! Ui,
A6: GWN j GWN h(SIDjkXGWN) ! Sj,
A7: Sj j Sj
h(SIDjkXGWN) ! GWN.
Step 4. Security goals. The nine security goals which are expected to be verified after analyzing
the protocol by BAN-logic are listed by G1, ..., G9 as below. For instance, the goal G1 states that the
gateway node must believe that the user Ui has sent the key Ki:
G1: GWN j Ui j Ki,
G2: GWN j Ui j SIDj,
G3: GWN j Ui j h(IDi),
G4: Sj j GWN j Ki,
G5: Sj j GWN j h(IDi),
G6: GWN j Sj j Kj,
G7: GWN j Sj j SKj,
G8: Ui j GWN j Kj,
G9: Ui j GWN j SKG.
Step 5. Deriving the security goals. Finally, to show the achievement of the above-mentioned
goals, we apply logical rules of the BAN-logic to the idealized messages and initial premises as
described below.
In accordance with IM1, A5 and R1:
Result1: GWN j Ui j Ki (satisfy G1);
Given the IM2, A5 and R1:
Result2: GWN j Ui j SIDj (satisfy G2);
In accordance with IM4, Result1 and R1:
Result3: GWN j Ui j h(ID)i (satisfy G3);
Given the IM5, A7 and R1:
Result4: Sj j GWN j (h(IDi), T2, Ki);
Taking into account Result4 and R2:
Result5: Sj j GWN j Ki (satisfy G4);
Result6: Sj j GWN j h(IDi) (satisfy G5);
In accordance with IM6, A6 and R1:
Result7: GWN j Sj j Kj (satisfy G6);
In accordance with IM7, A2 and R1:
Result8: GWN j Sj j SKj (satisfy G7);
In accordance with IM8, A1 and R1:
Result9: Ui j GWN j Kj (satisfy G8);
In accordance with IM9, Result9 and R1:
Result10: Ui j GWN j SKG (satisfy G9).
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Table 2. BAN-logic notations.
Notation Description
P j X P believes a proposition X
P / X P receives a message X
P j X P sent a message X
P
k
*) X P and X share the secret key k and only
these two entities can use k to prove its
identity to each other.
](X) It means that X is fresh
fXgk Encryption of X using the secret k
(X)k Hash computation of X using the secret k
P k$ Q P and Q share a secret k
P
Q If P then Q
Given the above steps, it can easily be concluded that the protocol can meet all preset goals.
Therefore, we can state that our proposed scheme is secure.
8. Performance Comparison
In this work, we propose a new 3FA protocol to overcome the security weaknesses of the
Amin et al. [15] scheme. We show how our enhanced protocol is not only secure but also efficient
enough to be used in HWSNs. The discussion about the security features, computational overhead and
computational cost offered by our proposed scheme and other related schemes, such as Amin et al. [15],
Yeh et al. [32], Xue et al. [7], Das et al. [44], Jiang et al. [33], Das et al. [45] and Gope et al. [24] is
presented in this section.
8.1. Security Features’ Comparison
In Table 3, we sum up the security features offered by our proposed protocol and other similar
ones. The symbol “Yes” indicates that the scheme is secure against the related attack and the symbol
“No” indicates the contrary. From this, we can conclude that our proposal satisfies all the security
features required and offers a higher security level than its predecessors. In addition, protocols
[7,24,32,33] do not provide three-factor authentication while our scheme does.
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Table 3. Security features’ comparison.
Security Features Amin et al. [15] Yeh et al. [32] Xue et al. [7] Das [44] Jiang et al. [33] Das[45] Gope et al. [24] Ours
Protection of user untraceability No No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Resistance against replay attack Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Resistance against user impersonation attack No No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Resistance against gateway node impersonation attack Yes No No No No No Yes Yes
Resistance against sensor node impersonation attack Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Resistance to de-synchronization attack No No No No No No Yes Yes
Support of dynamic node addition Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Robustness against insider attack Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Robustness against stolen smartcard attack Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
User anonymity Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Resistance against identity guessing attack Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Support of three-factor security Yes No No Yes No Yes No Yes
Supports correct password update Yes No No Yes No Yes No Yes
Resistance against session key disclosure attack No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
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8.2. Overall Computational Overhead Comparison
In HWSNs, sensors have limited energy so any authentication protocol designed for these
networks should be lightweight and energy efficient. Moreover, we use the model represented
in Figure 1a to design our scheme. In our scheme, we use the hash, and the fuzzy extractor functions,
which are both efficient. In fact, using the low-power cryptographic functions, rather than a very
demanding one, can reduce energy consumption [46]. According to the results of the experiments
presented in [24], each modular exponential operation in ECC-160 algorithm consumes 1.2 Ws energy
and takes tExp = 11.69 ms execution time. Moreover, for symmetric key encryption/decryption (128-bit
AES-CBC), the running time and energy consumption are approximately tsym = 4.62 ms and 0.72 Ws
and for hash function (SHA-256) these two values are approximately tHash = 1.06 ms and 0.27 Ws,
respectively. These results were obtained using the MSB-430 sensor boards with the TI MSP430 micro
controller [24]. Moreover, the time that the fuzzy extractor takes t f is about 17.1 ms [47]. In Table 4,
previous works [7,15,24,32,33,44,45] and our proposed scheme are compared in terms of computational
cost. As shown in this table, in our proposal, the total computational cost is only 25 tHash + t f .
Although our proposed scheme consumes slightly more time than some proposals [7,24,33], these extra
time is because of the additional operations needed for securing the scheme (improving security pitfalls
of its predecessors) and the three-factor capability, which is critical for secure HWSN networks. Finally,
it is worth noticing that our results are similar to [15,45], but we offer a higher security level.
Table 4. Overall computational overhead of the authentication phase.
Scheme User GW Sensor Node Total Cost Rough Estimation
Amin et al. [15] 10tHash + t f 11tHash 4tHash 25tHash + t f 43 ms
Yeh et al. [32] 2tExp + tHash 4tExp + 4tHash 2tExp + 3tHash 8tHash + 8tExp 100 ms
Xue et al. [7] 7tHash 10tHash 5tHash 22tHash 23 ms
Das [44] 7tHash + t f tSym + 2tHash tSym + 2tHash 11tHash + 2tSym + t f 38 ms
Jiang et al. [33] 7tHash 10tHash 5tHash 22tHash 23 ms
Das [45] 9tHash + t f 11tHash 5tHash 25tHash + t f 43 ms
Gope et al. [24] 7tHash 9tHash 3tHash 19tHash 20 ms
Ours 10tHash + t f 11tHash 4tHash 25tHash + t f 43 ms
8.3. Computational Cost and Execution Time
To achieve better efficiency and taking into account the energy restrictions of sensor nodes,
the computation costs of sensors should be kept as low as possible. In Table 5, we summarize both
the computational cost and execution time of our proposal and its predecessors [7,15,32,33,44,45].
From this, it is clear that our proposal is one of the most efficient in terms of energy and execution
time. That is, our proposal can be fitted in resource-limited sensor nodes.
Table 5. Computational cost and execution time comparison.
Scheme Computational Cost Execution Time
Amin et al. [15] 1.08 Ws 4.24 ms
Yeh et al. [32] 3.21 Ws 26.56 ms
Xue et al. [7] 1.35 Ws 5.3 ms
Das [44] 1.53 Ws 7.8 ms
Jiang et al. [33] 1.35 Ws 5.3 ms
Das [45] 1.35 Ws 5.3 ms
Gope et al. [24] 0.81 Ws 3.18 ms
Ours 1.08 Ws 4.24 ms
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9. Conclusions
In heterogeneous wireless sensor networks (HWSNs), we find sensors with different capabilities
and functionalities and dispersed within a defined area. Generally, their capabilities, such as
computation and energy, are very limited. The security of these devices is pivotal and challenging due
to its constrained resources. In this vein, we propose a secure and efficient three-factor authentication
(3FA) scheme that is suitable for HWSNs and enhances the security of a recent proposed protocol [15].
Meanwhile, we showed how [15] is not resistant to user impersonation and de-synchronization attacks
and also the attacker can track the user by eavesdropping only one session. In addition, an adversary
can disclose the session key under the common assumption that the hardware of sensors is not
tamper-resistant. To scrutinize the security of our proposal, we informally and formally analyze its
security and show how our protocol guarantees all the security features and provides the highest
security level in comparison with their predecessors. Moreover, in relation to performance, our scheme
consumes only few milliseconds and is very efficient in terms of energy consumption. All of this
renders our scheme adequate for HWSNs in which sensors generally have very limited resources.
Therefore, as a future work, we aim to propose a new scheme to support user access control that
guarantees authorized users to access the information allowed in HWSNs.
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